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In the Supreme Court of the State of Utah 
LOCAL REALTY COMPANY, a 
Corporation, 
Plaiintiff and Appellant, 
vs. 
V. A. LINDQUIST and MARY 
LINDQUIST, his Wife, 
Defendants and Respondents. 
No. 6004 
BRIKF' OF RF~SPONDENTS 
Introd~tction: Respondents accept the Statement 
of "B'acts, FindingR of F'act and Conclusions of Law, and 
the Judgment printed in Appellant's brief. 
On page 8 of Appellant's brief is stated the ques-
tion of law which Appellant asserts is involved in 
this case. We submit that such statement is inaccurate. 
The real question, we bPlieve, would more nearly be 
stated thus: 
Is the purchaser at execution sale entitled to 
recover rPnt from the mortgagor-owner for the 
latter's use and ocrupation during the redemp-
tion period 1 
In th(~ lower courts it was stipulated that if a 
receiver had heen appointed during the redemption 
pc>riod in this casP, the value of his services in caring 
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for the property would be tantamount to rentals 
claimed by Appellant-Purchaser, and further, that Re-
spondents, during said period, took as good care of 
the property as a receiver would have done. 
ARGUMT,~NT 
1. A 1\lORTGAGOR-0\VNI~R HAS TITL~ AND 
THE RIGHrr TO POSSms~SION OF HIS PROPERTY 
THROUGHOUT THE REDIGMPTTO,\' PER I 0 D 
WITHOU'l1 PAYMENT OF1 RENT. 
It is elementary in a "Lien" State (Utah) that 
the mortgagor has title throughout thP redemption 
perod, appellant's novel revenm~ stamp argument, page 
21 of its brief, to thf~ contrary notwithstanding. Our 
Court is not conc<>rned with the construction the Col-
lector of Internal RPvPnu<~ places on our statutes. The 
Utah cases and many of appellant's authoritiPs estab-
lish that title does not pass until sheriff's deed. 
Occupation without payment of rent is an mm-
d~~nt to mortgagor's rig·hts. Under 104-37-37, purchaser 
at execution sale might bP Pntitled to a profit, pro-
ceed, rent or income extra the occupation and use. 
Holmes v. GmvPnhorst, 263 N. Y. 148, 188 N. 
E. 285, 1933. 
If Lindquists had rented a room or the g·arage in our 
principal case, there may be a basis in equity for 
turning· the "proceeds" ovPr to thP appellant. But it 
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1s submittPd that this is aR far as 104-37-37 could go. 
At le,ast it is as far a.s any case cited by Appellant 
qoes. We are concPrnPd with whether the mortgagor-
ownPr in possPssion during redemption is to be bur-
dPned with payment of rent for his own occupation and 
use. Examin inp; appellant's authorities either factually 
or b? dPcision, we find no caRe requiring such payment 
for hiR own occupation and nsP. In the order cited by 
Ap]wllant, thP caRe of: 
Pann Morf,qaqr Loan Co. v. Pettet, 200 N. W. 
4-97, 36 A. L. R. 598, 1924, concPrns the appoint-
ment of a rpceiver and dPrides North Dakota 
RtatutPR entitle thP mortgagor to thP rentR and 
profits and poRseRRion of thP property, 
Reynolds v. 0nthr·op, 7 Cal. 4-3, is not pertinent 
since it involves recovery h? the purchaser from 
a third party leRs·eP of th<> mortgagor-owner. 
M cDe1•itt 1•. SuUivan, 8 Cal. 593, iR inapplicable 
for thP Rame r<>aRon, 
Harris v. Reynolds. 13 Cal. 515. 73 Am. Dec. 
600, 1 Rfl9, is not pertinPnt, Rinre Harris did not 
suP Rf~vnoldR for rPnt bnsed on the latter·s 
own ocdupntion. hut mPrely for "profits" nccrn-
inp; through salPs of watH, 
Hill v. Tmtlor. 22 CaL 191, is not in point, the 
plaintiff merely prayim~· for appointment of a 
rPceiver to eollcet profits, not praying for rent-
als hnsN1 on defendant's own occnpntion nnd 
URP, 
TV alker v. McCusker, 71 Cal. 594, 12 P. 723, is 
not pertinPnt for thP rPason thnt plnintiff seeks 
recovery from a third party other than the 
mortgagor-owner, 
Cla.rke v. Cobb, 121 Cal. 595, 54 P. 74, does not 
apply sinre recovery is sought from a third 
party lessee, 
Shintaffer v. Bank of Italy, 13 P. (2d) 668, 1932, 
does not apply since plaintiff sued for crops 
receiv(~d as "rc>n t" by the mortgagor from his 
lessc>e, 
First Nat·iotwl Tn1sf v. Staley, 25 P. (2d) 982. 
Hl33, is inapplicablP since it sc>eks to collect 
rents, thc>rc~ being no prayer for rent for the 
mortgagor's own occupation and use, and 
Clifford v. Henry, 169 N. W. 508, 1918, is not 
applicable since it was for r0cov0ry of crops 
by way of rent. 
ApparPntly counsc>l for appella11t misintPrprd tlw 
facts of our principal case. They Prroneously attempt 
to categorize our casu by (·itation of authority not m 
point. CarPfu] analysis of the cas(~ reveals no fact or 
d(~cision bringing our case within appellant's author-
ities. H arr·is v. Reynolds, supra, the backbone of ap-
pellant's theory and the backbreaker of mortgagors if 
appellant be corrPct, does not solve our problem. At-
tention is dirPctPd to the following companion cases, 
carefully omitt0d by appellants, for a factual under-
standing of Harris v. Reynolds: 
Raun v. Reynolds, 11 Cal. 15, 
Reynolds v. Harris, 14 Cal. 668, 
RatM1 v. Reynolds, 15 Cal. 460, 
Rattn v. Reynolds, 18 Cal. 27G, and 
Harris v. Reynolds, supra. 
.. 
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From these rr~lat<~d casPs it appears that Reynolde 
mortgaged to Harris' assignor. Default and foreclosure 
ensued. In tlw words of Reynolds v. H ar1·is, 14 Cal. 668 
at page 677, Harris sued Reynolds "to obtain a 1"e-
ceiver of the rents and profits pending the time of re-
demption. In this action (Harris v. Reynolds) the Dis-
trict Court comJwlled Reynold8 (in possession) to pay 
the PROCIGEDS of the canals into court during the 
time allow<•d for redemption; and after the time for 
redemption had Pxpin•d aud Harris had obtained his 
de<~d the Court rendered final judgment in favor of 
Harris and din•ctPd that tlw money in Court (collected 
from third pa rtics) bP paid over to him." Now here 
in these cnse>s is there> a suggestion or prayer thnt 
Reynolds, tlw mortgagor-ownPr in posse!'sion, be re-
quired to pay rent for his own occupation. Only "pro-
fits," or "rentals," or "collections" wPre prayed for. 
Reynolds wns treated as a "truste>e." Numerous othPr 
phrases iu the cases indicate that it was something 
over and above mere occupation and U8<~ by the mort-
gagor for which the plaintiff was prayiug, and about 
which the court was talking. In one of the cases, Rey-
nolds retriev<~d what he had paid ovPr. If ruppellant. 
be correct, Reynolds could have sued Harris as 
"tenant in p<msession" for Ui:il~ and occupation by 
Harris, but such was not attempted. 
W<• tug<' at this point 1lwt Proposition II on pagr 
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22 of appellant's brief is a generallty based on false 
logic. No case cited warrants a construction including 
the facts of our principal case. 
II. SECTION 104-37-37 R. S. U. 1933 DOES NOT 
APPLY TO A MORTGAGOR-OWNER IN POSSES-
SION DURING RF.DEMPTTON PERIOD. 
A. This seems to be born out by the Utah Cases: 
McLaughlin v. Park City Bank, 63 Pac. 589, 
1900. 22 Utah 473. ' 
Carlquist v. Coltha'rp, 248 Pac. 481, 67 Utah 
514. 
In the McLaughlin cas<>, decided in 1900, Sec. 104-
37-37 then operative, one Cupit, judgment creditor, 
caused execution to issue and petitioned thP Court to 
require the rec<~iver, who represented the debtor-owner 
m possession, to account for rents, etc. With respect 
to liability for rents, occupation and use during the 
redemption period the case is squarely in point with 
our principal cas·e. The Court, among other things, 
said: 
" The real estate in controversy was 
rightfully held by the receiver with the right 
to the use, rents, and profits thereof for the 
benefit of the estate until Cupit should acquire 
title by sale on his execution .... An execution 
creditor is not entitled to possession and rents 
of the property levied upon before sale and be-
fore the time for ·redemption has expired . ... 
Under such circumstances Cupit had no rig·ht to 
chargP thP rec<:>iver with the rPnts an<l use of 
• 
the premist~s, which at most would about cover 
thr> expPnse of opPrating and keeping the build-
ing, Pte. in repair.'' 
In the Ca•rlquist case, 1926, after deciding that the 
mortgagor had title throughout the redemption period, 
the Court refutes ev0n the doctrine of Harris v. Rey-
nolds. ThE> Court states that the mortgagor, being en-
titled to tlw poss<>ssion of prt>mises, "as a necessary 
corollary" is r>ntitlPd to thP crops grown therPon, i.e., 
takes thP view that as long as the mortgagor is en-
titled to posspssion, he is entitled as a corollary, to 
the crops grown during· his right of possession. 
III. SUBSTANTIVE RIGHTS UNDER FORE-
CLOSURE DECREE ARE NO'r NECESSARILY DE-
TER~fiNED BY THE ST ATUTFJS ON EXFJCUTION. 
A. Mortgage statutes are separate and distinct 
from the Pxecution statute. 104-55-1 R. S. U. 1933 says: 
"Tlwre can be but one action for the recov-
ery of any debt or the enforcement of any right 
secured by mortgage upon real f~state or per-
sonal property, which action must be in accord-
ancP with the provisions of this chapter. Judg-
ment shall be given adjudging the amount due . 
. . . and din~cting the sheriff to proc0ed and sell 
the same aceording to the provisions of law n~­
latinq to sales on execution. 
Does the last sPntence nwan a '' nwthod '' or 
"procedur<~" of sal(~ 1 DoPs it also mean that substan-
tive rights of tlw parties arP d<'terminablP hy tlw exe-
10 
cution statute~ W c submit that the execution statutes 
govern the mPchanics of obtaining title, but not neces-
~arily the substantiv<> rights of the parties. The estab-
lished principles of ownership, rig·ht to possession and 
the incidental rights to rents, profitR and the like, we 
believe, are l0ft to the gpneral law, i. e., that in this 
reRp<>ct the mortgag·e aml exeeution Rtatutf's are mutual-
ly exclusive. 
In conclusion, we ~uhmit that: The appellant has 
cited no authority for his poRition; that our Court has 
conRtrued 104-37-37 to exclude a mortgagor-owner in pos-
s<>;;;sion; that ex<>cution statutes ne0d not be interpreted 
to govern substantive rights in mortg·age situations, and 
that to require payment of rent by the mortgagor-owner 
would encourage him to vacate immediately upon fore-
closure, would discourage n~dcmption, lead to waste and 
depreciation, cause indiRcriminate trespass, vandalism, 
would require mortgagee to employ a caretaker though 
hP has no right of pos;;;ession, would put words in the 
statute which do not exist, and would place upon our 
statute a eonstruction not based on any cih•d authority. 
RPspectfully submitted, 
F'. HENRI H:F~NRTOD, 
Attonwy for Defendants and Respondents. 
"-'' 
